Your firm has a monopoly over of two products, Good 1 and Good 2. Both products are produced at a constant marginal cost of $25. You face four consumers (or groups of consumers) with the following reservation prices: (Image)Suppose that you have three alternative pricing strategies: i) individual pricing, ii) pure bundling, and iii) mixed bundling. For each strategy, determine the optimal prices to be charged, which consumer buys which product and the resulting profit. Which pricing strategy would yield the largest profit? Consumer B C D Good 1 (S/unit) 15 40 70 85 Good 2 (S/unit) 90 45 30 20

Your firm has a monopoly over of two products, Good 1 and Good 2. Both products are produced at a constant marginal cost of $25. You face four consumers (or groups of consumers) with the following reservation prices: (Image)Suppose that you have three alternative pricing strategies: i) individual pricing, ii) pure bundling, and iii) mixed bundling. For each strategy, determine the optimal prices to be charged, which consumer buys which product and the resulting profit. Which pricing strategy would yield the largest profit? Consumer B C D Good 1 (S/unit) 15 40 70 85 Good 2 (S/unit) 90 45 30 20

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1E

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