What is the homogeneous-good duopoly Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is Q=4,000-1,000p, and Firm 1's and Firm 2's variable cost functions are V (g1) = 0.22q1andV (q2) = 0.22q2 respectively. Select one alternative: Both firms produce 1300 units of outpuit. Both firms produce 1280 units of output. Both firms produce 1240 units of output. Both firms produce 1260 units of output.
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- . The market for widgets consists of two firms that produce identical products. Competition in the market is such that each of the firms independently produces a quantity of output, and these quantities are then sold in the market at a price that is determined by the total amount produced by the two firms. Firm 2 is known to have a cost advantage over firm 1. A recent study found that the (inverse) market demand curve faced by the two firms is P = 280 – 2(Q1 + Q2), and costs are C1(Q1) = 3Q1 and C2(Q2) = 2Q2. a. Determine the marginal revenue for each firm. b. Determine the reaction function for each firm.Two firms sells an identical product. The demand function for each firm is given: Q = 20 - P, where Q = q1 + q2 is the market demand and P is the price. The cost function for reach firm is given: TCi = 10 + 2qi for i = 1, 2. a) If these two firms collude and they want to maximize their combined profit, how much are the market equilibrium quantity and price? b) If these two firms decide their production simultaneously, how much does each firm produce? What is the market equilibrium price? c) If Firm 1 is a leader who decides the production level first and Firm 2 is a follower, how much does each firm produce? What is the market equilibrium price?The marginal cost of a product is fixed at MC = 20. The demand for the product is Q = 100 - 2P. (a) Now consider a Cournot model with two firms that are choosing quantities simultaneously. What is the best reply (best response) function for each firm? What is theNash equilibrium? What is the total surplus? (b)What do you expect the total surplus would be with three firms? Why? (You do not need to calculate an exact value. You can say ”total surplus is at least 100”, or ”total surplus is at most 80”)
- What is the homogeneous-good dupopoly's Nash-Cournot equilibrium if the market demand function is Q = 300 - 1200p, and each firm's marginal cost is $0.22 per unit?Here is a market with three firms: 1, 2, and 3. The demand curve is P=100-Q. There is no fixed cost but the marginal cost 10 for all firms. Firm 1 is a leader firm so that it decides the quantity Q1 first. Then two firms respectively decide their quantities Q2 and Q3 simultaneously. 1) At an equilibrium (SPE), Q1 is Q2=Q3= 2) At the equilibrium, (the market quantity) Q= and (the market price) P= 3) The profit of firm 1 is while the profit of firm 2 and 3 respectively isTwo firms compete in selling identical widgets. They choose their output levels Q1 and Q2 simultaneously and face the demand curve P = 30 - Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. Until recently, both firms had zero marginal costs. Recent environmental regulations have increased Firm 2’s marginal cost to $15. Firm 1’s marginal cost remains constant at zero. TRUE-FALSE: Is the following statement true of false? ”As a result, the market price will rise to the monopoly level.” Solve for the Cournot equilibrium and write a convincing explanation of your answer.
- There are only two driveway paving companies in a small town, Asphalt, Inc. and Blacktop Bros. The inverse demand curve for paving services is ?= 2040 ―20? where quantity is measured in pave jobs per month and price is measured in dollars per job. Assume Asphalt, Inc. has a marginal cost of $100 per driveway and Blacktop Bros. has a marginal cost of $150. Answer the following questions: Determine each firm’s reaction curve and graph it. How many paving jobs will each firm produce in Cournot equilibrium? What will the market price of a pave job be? How much profit does each firm earn?Consider two firms that produce the same good and competesetting quantities. The firms face a linear demand curve given by P(Q) =1 − Q, where the Q is the total quantity offered by the firms. The costfunction for each of the firms is c(qi) = cqi, where 0 < c < 1 and qiis the quantity offered by the firm i = 1, 2. Find the Nash equilibriumoutput choices of the firms, as well as the total output and the price, andcalculate the output and the welfare loss compared to the competitiveoutcome. How would the answer change if the firms compete settingprices? What can we conclude about the relationship between competitionand the number of firms?The inverse market demand curve for salmon is given by P(Y) = 100 – 2Y, and the total cost function for any firm in the industry is given by TC(y) = 4y. a. Suppose that two Cournot firms operated in the market. What would be the reaction function for Firm 1 and the reaction function of Firm 2? (Notes: The marginal cost is not zero). If the firms were operating at the Cournot equilibrium point, what would the industry output and price be? b. For the Cournot case, draw the two reaction curves and indicate the equilibrium point on the graph
- 10Two firms produce differentiated products. The demand for each firm’s product is as follows: Demand for Firm 1: q1 = 20 – 2p1 + p2 Demand for Firm 2: q2 = 20 – 2p2 + p1 Both firms have the same cost function: c(q) = 5q. Firms compete by simultaneously and independently choosing their prices and then supplying enough to meet the demand they receive. Please compute the Nash equilibrium prices for these firms.Consider two firms that produce the same good and compete setting quantities. The firms face a linear demand curve given by P (Q) = 1 − Q, where the Q is the total quantity offered by the firms. The cost function for each of the firms is c(qi) = cqi, where 0 < c < 1 and qi is the quantity offered by the firm i = 1,2. Find the Nash equilibrium output choices of the firms, as well as the total output and the price, and calculate the output and the welfare loss compared to the competitive outcome. How would the answer change if the firms compete setting prices? What can we conclude about the relationship between competition and the number of firms?Suppose that there are two firms in an industry and they face market demand y=400-0.5p where y=y1+y2 . The total cost functions of the firms are C1(y1)= 40y1 and C2(y2)= 2y22. a) Assume initially that the firms enter into Cournot competition. Calculate the equilibrium market price and each firm’s equilibrium output. That is, find y1c, y2sand pc.b) Calculate the equilibrium market price and each firm’s equilibrium output assuming that firm 2 is the Stackelberg leader and firm 1 is the follower. That is, find y1s, y2sand ps.