In a three stage alternating offers bargaining game, player 1 demands a fraction x of $100. If this is accepted by player 2, the $100 is split between the players with outcome ($100x,$100(1 - x)). Otherwise, at stage 2, player 2 makes a demand for a fraction y. If this is accepted by player 1, the $100 is divided accordingly but otherwise player 1 can make another offer and demand a fraction z. If that offer is rejected by player 2, the outcome is (0,0). Both players have a discount factor of 1/2. (a) Find a perfect equilibrium for this game. (b) Is there a first-mover advantage?
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- Suppose that, in an ultimatum game, the proposer may not propose less than $1 nor fractional amounts, and therefore must propose $1, $2, …, or $10 (see image attached below). The responder must Accept (A) or Reject (R). Suppose, first, that this game is played by two egoists, for whom u(x,y)=x. Find all subgame-perfect equilibria in this game. Suppose, second, that this game is played by two altruists, for whom u(x,y) = ⅔(x)1/2 + ⅓(y)1/2. Find all subgame-perfect equilibria in this game.Two players are bargaining over a three period bargaining model as discussed in class with player 1 making offers in rounds 1 and 3. Player 2 makes an offer in round 2 only. Each player has a common discount factor delta. The two players are bargaining to split $20. They have three time periods available to them for their bargaining game. At the end of round 3, if no agreement has been reached then player 1 receives $2 and player 2 receives $1 and the rest of the money is destroyed. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in the finite horizon model in which the game ends after period 3.Consider the following two-player game.First, player 1 selects a number x≥0. Player 2 observes x. Then, simultaneously andindependently, player 1 selects a number y1 and player 2 selects a number y2, at which pointthe game ends.Player 1’s payoff is: u1(x; y1) = −3y21 + 6y1y2 −13x2 + 8xPlayer 2’s payoff is: u2(y2) = 6y1y2 −6y22 + 12xy2Draw the game tree of this game and identify its Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
- two players, a and b are playing an asymmetrical game. there are n points on the game board. each turn player a targets a pair of points and player b says whether those two points are connected or unconnected. a can target each pair only once and the game ends when all pairs have been targeted. player b wins if a point is connected with all other points on the very last turn, while player a wins if any point is connected with all other points on any turn but the very last one or if no point is connected to all other points after the last turn. for what values of n does either player have a winning strategy?Consider the following simultaneous game: Player 1 U D Player 2 L 30,20 -10, -10 R -10, -10 20,30 Suppose player 1 plays a mixed strategy in which she plays U 25% of the time and D 75% of the time, and player 2 plays a mixed strategy in which she plays L 25% of the time and R 75% of the time. This pair of strategies ✓a Nash equilibrium. Player 1's expected payoff from playing U (when player 2 plays the mixed strategy above) is14. You have baked a cake, but your two dear daughters won't stop fighting on who gets the biggest slice. To settle the dispute, to ask your dear daughter one (DD1) to cut the cake and your dear daughter two (DD2) to choose which piece she wants. (a) Draw the extensive form of the game. Let dear daughter one's strategies be "Cut Evenly" or "Cut Unevenly"; depending on what is on the platter, dear daughter two's strategies might in- clude "Take Big Slice", "Take Small Slice", or "Take Equal Slice". Assign payoffs to dear daughter one and dear daughter two that grow with the size of the slice that they receive. (b) Use backward induction to find the equilibrium outcome of this game. (c) Is the promise to take a small slice by DD2, if DD1 cuts unevenly, credible? Explain carefully. (d) After the rules are announced, dear daughter two says "It is not fair! I want to be the one who gets to cut the cake, not the one who chooses the slice!". Is dear daughter two's complaint valid? You are…
- Return to the game between Monica and Nancy in Exercise U10 in Chapter 5. Assume that Monica and Nancy choose their effort levels sequentially instead of simultaneously. Monica commits to her choice of effort level first. On observing this decision, Nancy commits to her own effort level. What is the subgame - perfect equilibrium of the game where the joint profits are 5m + 4n+ mn, the costs of their efforts to Monica and Nancy are m2 and n2, respectively, and Monica commits to an effort level first? Compare the payoffs to Monica and Nancy with those found in Exercise U10 in Chapter 5. Does this game have a first-mover or second - mover advantage? Using the same joint profit function as in part (a), find the subgame - perfect equilibrium for the game where Nancy must commit first to an effort level. U10. Return to the game between Monica and Nancy in Exercise U10 in Chapter 5. Assume that Monica and Nancy choose their effort levels sequentially instead of simultaneously. Monica commits…Consider a two-player game in which the players take turns, with player 1 moving first. When it is a player's turn, she must announce a number between 1 and 3. The announced number is added to the previously announced numbers. The player who announces the number such that the sum of all announced numbers is 6 wins (receives 1) and the other loses (receives 0). Please indicate whether or not each of the following sequences of announcements is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Hint: Think about how one verifies whether or not a pair of strategies is a Nash equilibrium. P1 says 3, then P2 says 2, then P1 says 1 P1 says 1, then P2 says 3, then P1 says 2 P1 says 2, then P2 says 3, then P1 says 1 P1 says 3, then P2 says 1, then P1 says 2Amir and Beatrice play the following game. Amir offers an amount of money z € [0, 1] to Beatrice. Beatrice can either accept or reject. If Beatrice accepts, then Amir receives 1 - z dollars and Beatrice receives a dollars. If Beatrice rejects, then both receive no money. As in the Ultimatum Game, Amir cares only about maximizing the amount of money he receives. Beatrice, on the other hand, detests Amir, and therefore cares about the amount of money that both receive: if Amir receives y dollars and Beatrice receives a dollars, then Beatrice's payoff is a-ay where a > 0. (a) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game in which the two players choose simultaneously (thus Beatrice accepts or rejects without seeing Amir's offer). Solution: The NE are the strategy profiles in which Beatrice rejects and Amir's offer a satisfies 2-a(1-x) ≤0, i.e. r ≤a/(1+a). (b) Find all subgame perfect equilibria of the sequential game in which Amir first makes the offer and Beatrice observes the offer…
- UNIT 9 CHAPTER 5 In a gambling game, Player A and Player B both have a $1 and a $5 bill. Each player selects one of the bills without the other player knowing the bill selected. Simultaneously they both reveal the bills selected. If the bills do not match, Player A wins Player B's bill. If the bills match, Player B wins Player A's bill. Develop the game theory table for this game. The values should be expressed as the gains (or losses) for Player A. Is there a pure strategy? Why or why not? Determine the optimal strategies and the value of this game. Does the game favor one player over the other? Suppose Player B decides to deviate from the optimal strategy and begins playing each bill 50% of the time. What should Player A do to improve Player A’s winnings? Comment on why it is important to follow an optimal game theory strategy.Consider the following sequential game. Player 1 plays first, and then Player 2 plays after observing the choice of Player 1 (if necessary). At the bottom of the decision tree, the first number represents the payoff of Player 1, while the second number represents the payoff of Player 2. In equilibrium, the payoff of Player 1 is ✓ and the payoff of player 2 is Player 2 L₂ (-1,8) L₁ Player 1 R₂ (100,1) R₁ (1,0)Question 4 Consider allocating an object to one of two players when each player's pref- erences are her private information. Player 1's value for the object, denoted by vị is drawn from a continuous distribution with (1. 2] as its support. Player 2's value for the object, denoted by v2, is likewise drawn from the interval 0, 1]. 1. What is the equilibrium in dominant strategies if a second price auction is used to allocate the object. Is the outcome ex-post efficient? 2. For what pairs (v1, v2) should Player 1 and Player 2 respectively be allocated the object in a mechanism that maximizes expected revenue for the seller? 3. Comment on the differing allocations you obtained in the previous two parts.