Every year, management and labor renegotiate a new employment contract by sending their proposals to an arbitrator who chooses the best proposal (effectively giving one side or the other $1 million). Each side can choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive labor lawyer (at a cost of Employer Low Salary Offer High Salary Offer Employee Walks Employer gets 0 Employee gets 0 Employee Accepts Employer gets 100 Employee gets 75 Employee Walks Employer gets 0 Employee gets 0 Employee Accepts Employee gets 100 Employer gets 75 $200,000) who is effective at preparing the proposal in the best light. If neither hires lawyers or if both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to win three-quarters of the time. 1. Diagram this simultaneous-move game. 2. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? 3. Would the sides want to ban lawyers? 15-5 Renegotiating Employment ContractsEvery year, management and labor renegotiate a new employment contract by sending their proposals to an arbitrator who choosesthe best proposal (effectively giving one side or the other $1 million). Each side can choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive laborlawyer (at a cost of EmployerLow Salary Offer High Salary Offer Employee Walks Employer gets 0Employee gets 0Employee Accepts Employer gets 100 Employee gets 75 Employee Walks Employer gets 0 Employee gets 0 Employee AcceptsEmployee gets 100 Employer gets 75 $200,000) who is effective at preparing the proposal in the best light. If neither hires lawyers orif both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to win three-quarters of the time.1. Diagram this simultaneous-move game. 2. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? 3. Would the sides want to ban lawyers?

Simultaneous move game : In game theory a simultaneous game or static game is a game where each…

Every year, management and labor renegotiate a new employment contract by sending their proposals to an arbitrator who chooses the best proposal (effectively giving one side or the other $1 million). Each side can choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive labor lawyer (at a cost of Employer Low Salary Offer High Salary Offer Employee Walks Employer gets 0 Employee gets 0 Employee Accepts Employer gets 100 Employee gets 75 Employee Walks Employer gets 0 Employee gets 0 Employee Accepts Employee gets 100 Employer gets 75 $200,000) who is effective at preparing the proposal in the best light. If neither hires lawyers or if both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to win three-quarters of the time. 1. Diagram this simultaneous-move game. 2. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? 3. Would the sides want to ban lawyers?

Every year, management and labor renegotiate a new employment contract by sending their proposals to an arbitrator who chooses the best proposal (effectively giving one side or the other $1 million). Each side can choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive labor lawyer (at a cost of Employer Low Salary Offer High Salary Offer Employee Walks Employer gets 0 Employee gets 0 Employee Accepts Employer gets 100 Employee gets 75 Employee Walks Employer gets 0 Employee gets 0 Employee Accepts Employee gets 100 Employer gets 75 $200,000) who is effective at preparing the proposal in the best light. If neither hires lawyers or if both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to win three-quarters of the time. 1. Diagram this simultaneous-move game. 2. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? 3. Would the sides want to ban lawyers?

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter14: Labor Markets And Income

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18RQ: How does the presence of a labor union change negotiations between employers and workers?

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