5Determine which of the outcomes A to D below fit each scenario. Note that oneoutcome can fit several scenarios. It may also be the case that an outcome does not fit any ofthe scenario; if so, explain why. You should therefore start with outcome A and justify whichof the three scenarios with which it fits. Then do the same with outcome B and so on. youranswers well!Scenario I. "A small country imposes an import tariff"Scenario II. "A large country introduces an export subsidy"Scenario III. "A large country facing an import tariff"Outcome B. "The producer surplus before the implementation of the trade policy measure is 2000 per day; after the introduction 3,000 per day."Outcome C. "The consumer surplus before the implementation of the trade policy measure is29 000 per week; after implementation 10 000 per week. The country's treasury isstrengthened by 50,000 per week."Outcome D. "The trade policy measure means that the number of units of the good consumeddomestically of the good goes from 10,000 per week in free trade to 6,000 per week. Thecountry's exchange rate deteriorates."

Import implies to the method of bringing products or services into a country from another country…

Determine which of the outcomes A to D below fit each scenario. Note that one outcome can fit several scenarios. It may also be the case that an outcome does not fit any of the scenario; if so, explain why. You should therefore start with outcome A and justify which of the three scenarios with which it fits. Then do the same with outcome B and so on. your answers well! Scenario I. "A small country imposes an import tariff" Scenario II. "A large country introduces an export subsidy" Scenario III. "A large country facing an import tariff"

Determine which of the outcomes A to D below fit each scenario. Note that one outcome can fit several scenarios. It may also be the case that an outcome does not fit any of the scenario; if so, explain why. You should therefore start with outcome A and justify which of the three scenarios with which it fits. Then do the same with outcome B and so on. your answers well! Scenario I. "A small country imposes an import tariff" Scenario II. "A large country introduces an export subsidy" Scenario III. "A large country facing an import tariff"

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)

7th Edition

ISBN:9781285165875

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

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