Classify cach statement as either true or false. A tournament compensation scheme is subject to ability risk. Josephina receives the largest bonus because she had the highest sales last month. Jana had the second highest sales and receives the second largest bonus. This is an example of a tournament compensation scheme. Professors who grade on a curve are using a tournament compensation scheme. Answer Bank true false 000

Classify cach statement as either true or false. A tournament compensation scheme is subject to ability risk. Josephina receives the largest bonus because she had the highest sales last month. Jana had the second highest sales and receives the second largest bonus. This is an example of a tournament compensation scheme. Professors who grade on a curve are using a tournament compensation scheme. Answer Bank true false 000

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter18: Auctions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.1IP

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What is ability bias, example?
Suppose that the expected value of weekly profits for an ice cream shop, before paying the manager, Amy, is where e is Amy's weekly avertime hours. Amy is risk-neutral but incurs a cost for working overtime. Thus, tatal expected surplus is What level of effort maximizes total surplus? The value of overtime that maximizes total surplus is e-hours. (Enter your response rounded to one decimal place.) E(x)=500+10c C(e)=² E(S)-[(x)-C(e).
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What sectors of life the loss aversion can be found in? Explain.
Suppose you manage a factory with ten workers. Each worker’s output is determined by the equation q = e. Output sells in the market for a price of 40. The firm has fixed cost equal to 800, and variable costs aside from labor are 8 per unit of output. Worker utility is U = w – e2. Suppose you are paying workers a wage equal to bq. What is the profit- maximizing value of b? Suppose that the probability of worker error increases as the worker increases effort, and that worker error results in unusable output. Suppose that the probability of worker error is Pr[Error] = e/10. Then for worker effort level e, expected (usable) output is now determined by the equation E[q] = (1-Pr[Error]) x e. However, the problem is that you cannot detect errors until after the product is shipped to customers, meaning you pay workers for output before you know whether it is usable or not, and you have to refund your customers for unusable output. Demonstrate why you should not pay your workers the same…
Some economists maintain that the returns to additional years of education is actually quite small but that there is a substantial “sheepskin” effect whereby one receives a higher salary with the successful completion of degrees or the earning of diplomas (i.e., sheepskins).Explain how the sheepskin effect is analogous to a signaling model.
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Suppose there are two types of workers. Type 1 workers have a marginal product of labor (MPL) = 1. That is, if a firm hires an extra Type I worker, that worker will produce 1 extra unit of output. Type II workers have a MPL = 2. The firm can sell each extra unit of output for P = $12,000. Firms are unable to identify whether or not a worker is Type I or Type Il unless the worker sends a signal of what type they are. The signal that workers can send is a level of education, e. The firm adopts the following hiring strategy: If e >e* then offer the worker a wage rate equal to $24,000. If e < e* then offer the worker a wage rate equal to $12,000. The cost to Type I workers of getting education level e is $4000*e. The cost to Type II workers of getting education level e is $2000*e. If the firm sets e* = 8, which of the following statements is true? O Type I workers will not get e*, but Type II workers will get e*, which means there is a separating equilibrium. O Neither type of workers will…
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