1) Two firms produce goods that are imperfect substitutes. If firm 1 charges price p1 and firm 2 charges price p2, then their respective demands are q1 = 12 – 2pi + P2 and 92 = 12 + P1 – 2p2. So this is like Bertrand competition, except that when pi > p2, firm 1 still gets a positive demand for its product. Regulation does not allow either firm to charge a price higher than 20. Both firms have a constant marginal cost c = 4. (a) Construct the best reply function BR1(p2) for firm 1. That is, Pi the optimal price for firm 1 if it is known that firm 2 charges a price p2. Construct a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for this game. Are there any Nash equilibria in mixed strategies? If yes, construct one; if no provide a justification. BR1 (P2) is || (1) N
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- Two firms produce identical products at zero cost, and theycompete by setting prices. If each firm charges a low price,then both firms earn profits of zero. If each firm charges ahigh price, then each firm earns profits of £30. If one firmcharges a high price and the other firm charges a low price,the firm that charges the lower price earns profits of £50, andthe firm charging the higher price earns profits of zero. (a) Which oligopoly model best describes this situation?(b) Write this game in normal form.(c) Suppose the game is infinitely repeated. Can theplayers sustain the "collusive outcome" as a Nashequilibrium if the interest rate is 50 percent? Explain. Please answer the a, b and c parts.country where wine is difficult to grow. The demand for wine is given by p = $480 - .2Q, where p is the price and Q is the total quantity sold. The industry consists of just the two Cournot duopolists, Grinch and Grubb. Imports are prohibited. Grinch has constant marginal costs of $6 and Grubb has marginal costs of $45. How much Grinch's output in equilibrium? | a) 1,350 b) 2,025 c) 337.50 d) 675 e) 1,012.50(1) Two firms produce goods that are imperfect substitutes. If firm 1 charges price pi and firm 2 charges price p2, then their respective demands are q1 = 12 – 2p1 + p2 and q2 = 12 + p1 – 2p2. So this is like Bertrand competition, except that when p1 > P2, firm 1 still gets a positive demand for its product. Regulation does not allow either firm to charge a price higher than 20. Both firms have a constant marginal cost c=4. (a) Construct the best reply function BR1 (p2) for firm 1. That is, pi = the optimal price for firm 1 if it is known that firm 2 charges a price p2. Construct a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for this game. Are there any Nash equilibria in mixed strategies? If yes, construct one; if no provide a justification. BR1 (P2) is (b) Notice that for any given price p1, firm 1's demand increases with p2, so firm 1 is better off when firm 2 charges a high price p2. What is the best reply to p2 best reply to p2 = 0? 20? What is the (c) What prices for firm 1 are not…
- Alpha Gear is a fitness apparel company. One of their best selling products are their joggers. The company sells joggers under a block pricing scheme that charges $13 per pair of joggers if the customer buys up to 10 joggers and $8 if they buy 11 to 20 joggers. The demand curve is Q-1400 - 25P, and the marginal cost of making a pair of joggers is $5. What are the profits for Alpha Gear under this pricing scheme? 8975 8600 3600 12200 000Consider a simple monopolistic competition industry (many firms) in whicheach firm in the industry has one store. The store costs $200 per week andthe marginal cost is $10 per unit of output in addition to the fixed cost of the store. Hint: Mathematically this problem can be solved just like a monopoly problem. (a) If the typical the demand facing each individual firm is QD = 40−P eachweek, what price will a typical firm in this industry charge? (Hint: IfQD = 40 − P then P = 40 − QD and MR = 40 − 2QD). (b) Is the firm making a positive profit? What is the producer surplus? Whatis the profit after fixed costs? (c) Will new firms enter the market if demand stays the same and new firmsface the same demand and have the same costs? (d) In general, what is the long run profit of an average firm in a monopolistically competitive market.Two firms produce goods that are imperfect substitutes. If firm 1 charges price p1 and firm 2 charges price p2, then their respective demands are q1 = 12 - 2p1 + p2 and q2 = 12 + p1 - 2p2 So this is like Bertrand competition, except that when p1 > p2, firm 1 still gets a positive demand for its product. Regulation does not allow either firm to charge a price higher than 20. Both firms have a constant marginal cost c = 4. (a) Construct the best reply function BR1(p2) for firm 1. That is, p1 = BR1(p2) is the optimal price for firm 1 if it is known that firm 2 charges a price p2. Construct a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for this game. Are there any Nash equilibria in mixed strategies? If yes, construct one; if no provide a justification. (b) Notice that for any given price p1, firm 1’s demand increases with p2, so firm 1 is better off when firm 2 charges a high price p2. What is the best reply to p2 = 20? What is the best reply to p2 = 0 (c) What prices for firm 1 are…
- Two firms produce goods that are imperfect substitutes. If firm 1 charges price p1 and firm 2 charges price p2, then their respective demands are q1 = 12 - 2p1 + p2 and q2 = 12 + p1 - 2p2 So this is like Bertrand competition, except that when p1 > p2, firm 1 still gets a positive demand for its product. Regulation does not allow either firm to charge a price higher than 20. Both firms have a constant marginal cost c = 4. (a) Construct the best reply function BR1(p2) for firm 1. That is, p1 = BR1(p2) is the optimal price for firm 1 if it is known that firm 2 charges a price p2. Construct a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for this game. Are there any Nash equilibria in mixed strategies? If yes, construct one; if no provide a justification. (b) Notice that for any given price p1, firm 1’s demand increases with p2, so firm 1 is better off when firm 2 charges a high price p2. What is the best reply to p2 = 20? What is the best reply to p2 = 0 (c) What prices for firm 1 are…Suppose two firms engage in simultaneous quantity competition. Both firms have 0marginal cost. Firm A : P(Q)= 24-Q Firm B: P(Q)= 24-2Q a) Find the Nash Equilibrium quantities q^NE and profits.(b) Find the Monopoly Quantity QM and Profit.(c) Now suppose the game is repeated infinitely and each firm has a common discountfactor δ. Find the required discount factor to sustain the following grim triggerstrategy as a SPNE: Play Q^M /2 if this has been played in every previous period,otherwise play q^NE.10. The platypus is a shy and secretive animal that does not breed well in captivity. But two breeders, Sydney and Adelaide, have discovered the secret to platypus fer- tility and have effectively cornered the market. Zoos across the globe come to them to purchase their output; the world inverse demand for baby platypuses is given avby P=1,000-20, where Q is the combined output of blu Sydney (qs) and Adelaide (qA). vide a. Sydney wishes to produce the profit-maximizing quantity of baby platypus. Given Adelaide's choice of output, 9A, write an equation for the residual demand faced by Sydney. 19125 non c. ab. Derive Sydney's residual marginal revenue curve. Assume that the marginal and average total cost of raising a baby platypus to an age at which it can be sold is $200. Derive Sydney's reaction function. d. Repeat steps (a), (b), and (c) to find Adelaide's reac- tion function to Sydney's output choice. 18 e. Substitute Sydney's reaction function into Adelaide's to solve for…
- B 20. Two-part tariff. A two-part tariff is another price-discrimination method where the producer of argood is able to capture the entire consumer surplus. An example of this might be an amusement park that charges a fee for entry (the tariff), and then charges the customer for each ride (by buying tickets). Let's investigate how a firm sets the optimal two-part tariff by assuming that we have 100 consumers each, with demand for rides of p=9-q, and the costs of running the amusement park are C(q)=100+q. (a) Uniform pricing. If the firm acts as a monopoly, setting a single price, what is its profit- maximizing price, quantity of rides (per person and aggregate), and profit? (b) Marginal cost pricing. If the firm sets its price per ride equal to marginal cost, what is the number of rides it will sell (per person and aggregate) and consumer surplus? (c) Two-part tariff. If the amusement park uses a two-part tariff, setting its entrance fee equal to consumer surplus while charging a price…QUESTION 4: The graph below shows the demand and costs data for a one of firms operating in a market with a highly differentiated product/All underlying work must be shown MC ATC $11.50 $10.00 $9.00 $6.00 D MR 200 400 700 s00 Quantity A) Refer to the graph above. If the firm in the graph above maximizes profit, it will produce units of output and charge price per unit. A) 400; $10 B) 600; $6 C) 900; $9 D) 600; $11.50 B) Refer to the graph above. At the profit maximizing output level, the firm from above will earn: A) zero economic profit. B) $900 total economic profit. C) $2,700 economic profit. D) $2,700 economic loss. C) Refer to your answer above. You can conclude that if there are no barriers to entry: a) new fims will enter this industry in the long run in a search of profit. b) existing firms will exit this industry in the long run because of the short-run losses. c) this industry is in long-run equilibrium, and there are no incentives to enter or exit. d) the price per unit of…Billy Bob's is catering to Baruch College and there are two types of customers: faculty and students. There are 60 faculty members willing to pay $30 per meal while there are 500 students willing to pay $6 per meal. There are 560 meals available at the catering event. Suppose the total cost of catering the event, including the meals, is $1,000. How much profit will Billy Bob's earn if they can perfectly price discriminate? $800 O $2,000 $3,800 $4,800