Al Qaeda Downfall

Cronin’s work is laid out as comparative case study analyzing multiple terrorist organization in their final months of existence. Her research has identified six possible pathways that a terrorist campaign will end. In the first six chapters of the book, she examines these six pathways. In the final chapter, she attempts to figure out which lessons from the ending of previous terrorist campaigns can apply to a possible ending for the al-Qaeda terrorist campaign. Most of the book outlines specific case studies of terrorist groups from around the world. Each case study directly supports one of her six pathways for the end of a terrorist campaign. These case studies provide an overview of the demise of multiple terrorist organization and provide what she believes is a consistent interlocking pattern that can be utilized in dealing with current and future terrorist group threats and how they can be directed to an end. The six pathways or patterns that Cronin has identified are decapitation, negotiation, success, failure, repression, and reorientation (Cronin, p.8).

When discussing terrorism, the groups which most frequently come to mind are those which operate either internationally or specifically in foreign countries, such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Al Shabab. However, the United States has a number of domestic terror groups some well-organized, some loosely connected that have perpetrated serious attacks over the last few decades. Al-Qaeda's attacks on September 11th, 2001, and the subsequent wars born out of the United States' response to these attacks have meant that domestic terrorism is less widely discussed topic, this does not mean that domestic terrorist groups do not present a serious threat to the United States and its citizens. By examining known terrorist organizations within the United States and their classifications, it will be possible to demonstrate how and why the country has seen a rise in domestic terror over the last three decades, as well as some possible government responses to these groups that could help to prevent individuals from joining in the first place.

Although the threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations is often foremost in the public consciousness as a result of al-Qaeda's attack on September 11th, 2001, the threat from domestic terror groups remains a central concern of those responsible for homeland security. In fact, while the United States has not suffered from another foreign attack in the decade since 9/11, research by the Federal Bureau of Investigations, along with non-governmental organizations, has found that the number of domestic terror groups has increased, a trend only exacerbated by the economic recession (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009, Domestic Terrorism). While there are a wide variety of individual groups and ideologies, most domestic terror groups falls into one of three broad categories: religious extremism, white supremacy, and anti-government and separatists movements, including the militia movement. Examining these domestic terror groups in greater detail will aid in better understanding the full spectrum of threats considered by homeland security personnel.

This paper will talk about the largest terror group called Al Qaeda. Stating the facts on when this terror group formed, their motives, and graphs on numerous innocent lives. The most notorious Islamic terrorist group is Al Qaeda. Its pioneer, Osama Bin Laden, issued a fatwa (a religious decision) in February 1998 requiring an overall Islamic sacred war to slaughter Christians and Jews. Laden's key targets seem to be U.S. property. Al-Qaeda is a terrorist group that was established by Osama Bin Laden in the late 1980s. It started as a strategic system to help Muslims in Afghanistan battling against what was then the Soviet Union amid the Afghan War. Individuals were enrolled all through the Islamic world standing Al-Qaeda's roots and connections.

In this essay I am going to discuss whether Al Qaeda still poses a threat to the United States. The essay will discuss the current state, since 2013, of Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups. It will use the information to lay out claims and facts that show Al Qaeda is still remains a threat. Although the threat has diminished some since the 9/11 terror attacks it still remains. The threat has gone from huge major attacks to smaller, lone wolf, attacks on the mainland of the United States. Al Qaeda still poses a threat to U.S. embassies in the Middle East, troops stationed abroad, and U.S. aid workers abroad. Al Qaeda also poses a threat to the financial welfare of the United States. The

ISIS is a terrorist group that originated from Al Qaeda in 2004. This group was an ally to Osama Bin Laden’s notorious Al Qaeda; “meaning they both were radical anti-Western militant groups devoted to establishing independent Islamic state in the region” (Thompson, 2015). The differences with ISIS and Osama’s terrorist group is that ISIS has proved to be more brutal and more effective at controlling the territory it has seized. With ISIS being the strongest current terrorist organization the question has been proposed; how will the world defeat this “group”? How has it affected the world? How will the end of this “organization” affect the world, if there ever will be an end? In order for ISIS to be destroyed all of these questions must be

This article focuses on data of international terrorism compiled by institutions such as the RAND Corporation, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) and International Terrorism Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATES). The purpose of the article is to seek the answer for the following questions: Has there been an increase in the raw number of international terrorist incidents over time? Secondly, have individual acts of international terrorism become more violent over time? Thirdly, has the frequency (annual number) of lethal international terrorist incidents (a lethal incident is defined as leading to at least one death) itself increased over time? And fourthly, what patterns other than time dependence (or independence)

The issue of popular support is further connected to terrorist group’s specific objectives, or goals. In general, terrorists motivated by a religious component are often associated with ‘apocalyptic’ like goals. Hoffman notes that these ‘apocalyptic’ goals, are in nature more violent when compared to the often more tangible political based goals of many secular groups. The association between religiously motivated terrorist groups and apocalyptic like goals is well known throughout academia. Jessica Stern’s book, Terror in the Name of God further references this connection. She is particularly careful not to equate these general end-of-time beliefs to one religion in particular. Instead she notes how such beliefs often span across multiple religions by noting their presence in various sacred texts across all three of the major Abrahamic faiths. She further ties back to Hoffman’s work when discussing how apocalyptic like goals often allow for more violence and destruction when compared to other terrorist objectives (such as forming a new government, or expelling a foreign nation from perceived territory). While Hoffman notes the specific constituency that secular terrorists must appeal to, Stern ties the lack of a needed supportive constituency back to religious terrorist goals. Because religiously motivated groups often seek the complete destruction of society, these groups are less concerned with long-term popular support, (beyond basic funding and recruitment needs.)

Just as there is no uniform consensus regarding the definition of terrorism, the same issue also applies to the statistics regarding de-radicalization and disengaging of terrorists from their groups. In the case of the home-grown terrorist, unless it was an incarcerated terrorist, how could this information even be tracked? Although similarities to other types of group-based crime have been attempted, the difference lies within the motivations of terror groups. Other types of criminal groups arise from the issues of low socio-economic capital; in contrast, terror groups are based upon an ideology. Of course, poverty and low opportunities may encourage the formation of a terrorist mentality but it is not the driving force. Extremism in religion is usually the root cause of

The relative success against groups like Al-Qaeda is with the power of money and adjusting our nations and other partnering countries financial laws to report “shady transactions that fit a certain criteria. As for Al-Qaeda, the main success we had was the taking down of Osama Bin Laden, which was where a great amount of Al-Qaeda’s money came from (Guiora A., 2008).

Jessica’s Stern’s “The Protean Enemy” was very interesting reading regarding the terrorist’s survival and development throughout the years. What really caught my attention is how organizations had original “missions” or “plans” that involved a smaller scale and more personal grievance against their own government, but then were evolved to a huge scale that involved innocent civilians and outside states (especially the United States). For example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), whose original objective was to fight the oppressive rulers of Egypt and convert Egypt into a Islamic State. But since their group failed and started to disintegrate due to their leader’s (Sheikh Omar Abdel Rhman) imprisonment by the United States, Ayman al-Zawahiri

The primary source of data is the open source Global Terrorism Database (2015) known as the GTD and maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). START is a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence at the University of Maryland that has been tasked by the Department of State to collect statistical data on terrorism in support of the annual Country Reports on Terrorism. GTD (2015), accompanied by an instructive codebook, contains 141,967 rows and 108 columns of data categorized and coded into fields, as shown in Table 3. We use relevant statistical data from the GTD (2015) to measure the independent and moderating variables. We augment the GTD data with terrorism data collected in the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, a compilation of 40,000 incidents of terrorism coded and detailed from 1968 to 2009 (RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, 2015).

Terrorism can be defined as both a global and a regional phenomenon. Globally, terrorist activity has increased since the late 20th century and has emerged as one of the critical issues associated with early 21st century geopolitics. In a regional sense, specific terrorist groups emerge in particularly troubled corners of the globe in direct response to ongoing issues in those regions. And while terrorist groups are region-specific and often ethnically or politically aligned to a specific set of ideological tenants, they are also often funded and supported through international and transnational support networks. According to our readings and discussions this week, we have established that this transnational support for terrorist organizations

Mathew Heazlett is a Master’s Student in the Terrorism & Counter Terrorism Studies at Henley-Putnam University. Submitted to the faculty of Henley-Putnam University, this research paper is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for TCT 596.4A, Origins, Evolutions, and trends in Terrorism and the Master’s Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Studies program. Contact Mathew Heazlett at MathewHeazlett@stu.henley-putnam.edu for correspondence regarding this paper.

Do to the overabundance of issues and difficulties involved in combating terrorism the United States will never completely end the threat of terrorist violence. For the last few decades, the U.S. has dealt with it fair share of terrorist incidents. These incidents have ranged from individuals with an axe to grind, small groups demanding social and political change, to attacks from transnational organizations with the intent to demoralize and destroy the United States. In order to protect its citizens and interests worldwide, the U.S. has committed to ending the terrorist threat. To accomplish this, the United States has utilized the military in various capacities, as well as all relevant political means. While these actions are normally effective