Reading analysis #4 (1)

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Apr 3, 2024

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Changing into Face of War The peacetime soldier's task is to prepare for the next war. This poses the question: Are we due for a fourth generation of warfare, and how will we prepare for it? The first generation reflects the change to musket and line and column warfare tactics due to the technology that developed the musket. Line and columns were developed to use the technology most efficiently. The second generation reflects the technological change from muskets to the machine gun. The tactics developed in this generation were still linear but evolved to accommodate the technology change. It also utilized technology such as railways and telegraphs. The Germans developed the third generation, which is 70 years old, in response to the increased power developed by the second generation's war tactics. Ideas were the main driving force, and nonlinear battle tactics were developed for the first time. These battlefield tactics existed since 1918, but the third generation brought out the technological development of the tank, which fortified it. Technology and ideas were the main catalysts of change between each generation of warfare. Minor elements from each generation of warfare carried over and expanded on insignificance. The fourth generation of warfare has four elements to carry over and expand: mission orders, decreased dependence on centralized logistics, maneuver, and internally collapsing enemies. Essentially, the fourth generation will be more dispersed and will have no definable warfronts. Technology-wise, elements such as EMPs, media manipulation, artificial intelligence, and robotics would be implemented within the fourth generation of warfare. While this allows for the destabilization of enemies, it may increase the risk of nuclear warfare, which may prevent nuclear-armed powers from partaking in fourth-generation warfare. Non-western ideas taking over and increasing influence would play a part in fourth-generation warfare, as Western ideas that were previously internationally dominant have decreased in influence, with Eastern ideas slowly taking their place on the international stage. Another indication of developing fourth-generation warfare lies in terrorism as it carries over from third-generation warfare, as terrorism is inherently more dispersed and has no set war fronts, relying heavily on maneuver. Terrorism relies on its ability to collapse its enemies from within while using said enemies' strength against them, "If we treat them within our laws, they gain many protections; if we simply shoot them down, the television news can easily make them appear to be the victims." Within each generation of warfare, the culture of order decreased. However, with terrorism as a signpost for upcoming fourth-generation warfare, it single-handedly eliminates the "culture of order" within the armed forces altogether. Wievirorka Terrorism has gone through significant transitions since the period between 1960 and 1980, moving from a classical era of terrorism to a global era of terrorism. Some claim that "modern terrorism" as it exists today has been around since the 1980s, claiming a progression, but comparing the tactics of terrorists then to now indicates an increase in "how far" terrorists are willing to go for their goals. Between 1960 and 1980, terrorism corresponded with three categories: extreme left, extreme right, or nationalist within the framework of the sovereign state it originated from. Extreme leftist terrorism was always characterized by its challenging of state authority; extreme right terrorism was less
widespread and characterized by "projects to take over the state." Nationalist terrorism was usually a result of movements trying to force the independence of nations through the means of violence. Classical terrorism originated from states and societies, representing deviations from political or ideological ideas. It was defined as a threat to "...states, their order, and possibly, their territorial integrity." The events of September 11, 2001, were the most significant example of the international change to the "global era of terrorism." The "globalization of terrorism" meant that terrorism could no longer be defined as being an internal issue within sovereign states but rather an issue that could directly impact states outside of the state of origin on an international level. Global terrorism is a combination of a mixture of internal, classical, and transnational actions, thereby requiring the international combination of militaries to ensure external protection and internal policing from all nation-states. Previous iterations of "global terrorism" mainly called for international support for a cause as a result rather than global action as a result. "Global terrorism" links transnational and state rationale, which can appear as exceptionally far apart ideologically, but global terrorism toes the line of both through "...their belong but also to their peregrinations in the universe of globalization which simultaneously fascinates and rejects them." Boot What is interesting about current international conflicts is that there has not been a conflict where it was just two militaries against each other since 2008. However, now, in this modern age of warfare, frontlines and war fronts are challenging to define due to conflicts consisting of guerilla attacks. Boot connects guerrillas and terrorists as "close cousins," which often goes ignored despite every conflict currently consisting of such warfare. It is difficult to find a country that has not ever engaged in warfare as guerilla warfare is as old as humankind, as the author references tribal war and "...is the norm of armed conflict." Previously, guerilla warfare was defined as an "eastern way of war" as a result of Chinese and Vietnamese communists seizing power using such tactics, but it has commonly been the last resort of those unable to create armies. Terrorism is similar in the sense that it is the last resort of those unable to create guerilla forces. The rise in public opinion and respect for guerilla warfare is partially responsible for the rise of guerilla conflicts on the global stage. Boot speaks about the overestimation and underestimation of guerilla forces before 1945; those with regular armies that would battle guerilla forces would not afford them the same amount of respect, leading to humiliating defeats for the armies. However, since 1945, a change of perspective towards guerilla warfare elevated guerilla warfare to an "invisible" status despite many guerilla forces being rarely able to achieve their goals. Boot yet again ties in terrorism, stating that terrorists have lower success rates for their own goals in comparison to the few times that guerilla forces have achieved their own goals. Anti-insurgency campaigns that eliminate and deter guerilla forces as well as terrorists have been shown to be effective internally when analyzing the French Revolution, in which the French army killed numerous civilians and was able to successfully suppress revolt within the country. However, overseas in Haiti, that tactic did not lead to a victory for France during the slave revolt led by Toussaint L'Ouverture. Another successful anti-insurgency campaign is known as "winning hearts and minds," which involves leading the population to
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