Tutorial 3 - answers

.docx

School

Australian National University *

*We aren’t endorsed by this school

Course

3006

Subject

Finance

Date

Apr 3, 2024

Type

docx

Pages

4

Uploaded by xinghun88 on coursehero.com

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY School of Finance, Actuarial Studies and Applied Statistics College of Business and Economics Financial Intermediation and Debt Markets Tutorial 3 - answers Question 1 What is moral hazard? How did the fixed-rate deposit insurance program of the FDIC contribute to the moral hazard problem of the savings association industry? What other changes in the savings association environment during the 1980s encouraged the developing instability of the industry? How does a risk-based insurance program solve the moral hazard problem of excessive risk taking by FIs? Is an actuarially fair premium for deposit insurance always consistent with the social goal of equal access to financial services? How does the US deposit insurance system differ from Australia’s? What are your opinions regarding the current Australian system? What changes might you make if you were asked to? Solution Moral hazard occurs in the depository institution industry when the provision of deposit insurance or other liability guarantees encourages the institution to accept asset risks that are greater than the risks that would have been accepted without such liability insurance. The fixed-rate deposit insurance administered by the FDIC created a moral hazard problem because it did not differentiate between the activities of risky and conservative lending institutions. Consequently, during periods of rising interest rates, savings associations holding fixed-rate assets were finding it increasingly difficult to obtain funds at lower rates. Since the deposits were insured, managers found it easier to engage in risky ventures in order to offset the losses on their fixed-rate loans. In addition, as the number of failures increased in the 1980s, regulators became reluctant to close down savings associations because the fund was being slowly depleted. The combination of excessive risk-taking together with a forbearance policy followed by the regulators led to the savings association industry crisis. A risk-based insurance program should deter banks from engaging in excessive risk- taking as long as it is priced in an actuarially fair manner. Such pricing currently is being practiced by insurance firms in the property-casualty sector. However, since the failure of commercial banks can have significant social costs, regulators have a special responsibility towards maintaining their solvency, even providing them with some form of subsidies. In a completely free market system, it is possible that DIs located in sparsely populated areas may have to pay extremely high premiums to compensate for a lack of diversification or investment opportunities. These DIs may have to close down unless
subsidized by the regulators. Thus, a strictly risk-based insurance system may not be compatible with the social goal of equal access to financial services. The key difference between the Australian and US schemes today is that Australian banks do not pay for the insurance they receive. The Australian scheme was hastily implemented in the middle of the GFC and so the policy parameters were not well thought out. We have seen the problems that underpriced or miss-prices insurance can cause and so free insurance (from a moral hazard point of view) is not a very good idea. The most obvious change is that one should introduce risk-based pricing of deposit insurance for our banks, collect the fees and set up a fund to manage the premiums. The other concern is that because there are no fees collected, the scheme is totally unfunded which means if a failure were to occur that then Treasure (i.e. tax-payer) will have to pay for the losses. Not an ideal situation. Question 2 Read the articles “Too big to fail, so why have deposit insurance?” and “Deposit insurance can’t handle large bank failures” and answer the following questions. a. Explain why the failure of a large institution is problematic for a deposit insurance fund. Large institutions have lots of deposits! So the failure of one large institution is the same a many small institutions at the same time. The CBA for example has about 20% of all Australian deposits so if it fails this might pose a big problem. Deposit insurance funds only have a limited amount of money available so large losses can drain the fund of all its reserves and then it will have to start selling assets. The sale of assets could lead to losses and send the fund itself broke. We saw this with the FSLIC in the US. b. How does the solution the Indian regulators came up with to handle Yes Bank’s failure get around this problem? Indian regulators orchestrated a bailout of Yes bank. A government owned bank SBI recapitalized Yes bank meaning that it is no longer in default. c. What other problems can the solution identified in (b) create for regulators? Well. Yes bank is a big bank. And bailing out a big bank creates the “too big to fail” problem and its associated costs. One of these costs in the moral hazard problem that is created. Question 3 Read the article “What negative interest rates mean for savers and investors” below and answer the following questions:
Your preview ends here
Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version
  • Access to all documents
  • Unlimited textbook solutions
  • 24/7 expert homework help