Example Game Theory Questions -- solutions guide-1
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ERIC
BUDISH
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY
eric.budish@ChicagoBooth.edu Winter 2024 Suggested Answers for Example Game Theory Modeling Questions Q1 Suggested Solution 1.
What are the audiophiles’ valuations for the high and the low quality speakers? Would they be willing to buy high quality speakers? Would they be willing to buy low quality speakers? Which, if any, type of speakers would they buy if both types are available? Answer the same questions for philistines as well. Audiophiles valuations: For high quality speakers: 950-4000*0.1-300=250 For low quality speakers: 950-4000*0.2-100=50 They would be willing to buy high quality; They would be willing to buy low quality; They would buy high quality if both were available. Philistines’ valuations: For high quality speakers: 350-1000*0.1-300=-50 For low quality speakers: 350-1000*0.2-100=50 They would not want to buy high quality speakers. They would be willing to buy low quality speakers. They would buy low quality if both were available. 2.
Draw the payoff matrix for this game between A and B. Identify all dominant strategies and Nash equilibria (if any). Describe in words what you would expect the outcome to be and why. If both firms produce high quality speakers, they split the audiophile market. They each will have volume of 50 and variable profits of $100 per unit, for total profit of $5k. Philistines do not buy. If one firm produces high quality speakers and the other produces low quality speakers, then the high quality firm will sell to all 100 audiophiles, for profits of 100*$100 = $10k, while the low quality firm will sell to all 100 Philistines, for profits of 100*$40 = $4k. Last, if both firms produce low quality speakers, then ALL customers will buy low quality speakers, so they each have quantity of 100 and profits of 100*$40 = $4k. The resulting payoff matrix is:
2 B High Low High 5 4 5 10 A Low 10 4 4 4 High is the dominant strategy for both A and B. The unique Nash equilibrium is (High, High) Both companies will produce high quality speakers because the margin on those speakers is more than twice as large as the margin on low quality. Hence, producing high quality speakers is a more profitable option regardless of what the other company does. In other words, High is a dominant strategy. The (High, High) outcome does not maximize their joint profits. They would make more money if one made high and the other low, but neither company internalizes the impact of their choice on the other company’s profits. 3.
What do you expect would happen if A and B merge? Would they be able to create or capture more value?
The merged company would produce both High and Low speakers since that would generate profits of $14,000, which is more than the $10,000 they would get from producing only High. This provision of a new good would create value. The merger would also capture value if the combined firms could raise prices, but the model presumes that the price of each good is the same whether there are one or two firms producing it. Q2 Suggested Solution (i)
OpenTable should set the price to $25 per night to maximize revenue. This way it sells to all the H restaurants (50% of the market) and to none of the L restaurants. A price of $1 gets more sales – now L’s buy too – but less total revenue. (ii)
Yes, an H-type should be willing to be listed. The first H-type to list would go from having 50 customers (all Phonies) to having a full restaurant with 100 customers. The increase in variable profits more than compensates for the cost of paying OpenTable for web traffic. (iii)
Yes, if there are 49 H-types on opentable.com, the 50
th
should join too. With 50 restaurants on opentable.com, each will get 2 “Webbies”. This traffic costs $2 in OpenTable fees, but generates $20 in incremental variable profits, so it is profitable to join. (iv)
No, an L-type restaurant should not join. This is a bit subtle. The difference versus an H-
type is that the L-types don’t really want the hardware system. They would have to pay $25 per night for a system that gives them only $1 per night of incremental benefit. This
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Related Questions
Suppose that the restaurant industry in Honolulu is monopolistically competitive
and is currently in Stage 2 equilibrium (firms
currently make zero profit). The graph below shows the cost curves for a
typical restaurant in this industry.
(a) Draw a demand curve and an MR that is
consistent with this market being in
Stage 2 equilibrium.
(b) Show the equilibrium price
Now suppose an highly-infectious new virus
comes to the island, causing demand for restanrant meals to shift in.
(c) What would you expect this change in
restaurant demand when the number of firms is fixed? Explain.
(d) What would you expect the change in demand to do to the number of meals sold, prices and profits of firms in the long
run if firms can enter and exit? What happens to the mumber of restaurants?
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q60c- Is the Nash equilibrium the best outcome for this problem? Explain
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Question 1
iii. “In recent times, we are seeing residential customers demanding higher broadband subscription and speeds which poses a dilemma to pay TV providers.”
To what extent is this statement accurate.
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The definition of Game Theory is: Game Theory is a field of mathematics that analyzes strategic-interaction between rational, self-interested players.
Give an example of a situation that can be considered a game from the perspective of game theory. You can choose this example from your experience or you can consider a hypothetical scenario. Use your own imagination and make
sure this is not any famous or known example used in game theory.
1. What is happening in this game?
2. Who are the players in this game?
3. What are the possible actions for each player?
4. Represent the game in normal form with the utilities you have mentioned in the description of the game.
5. Justify the utilities you have assigned.
6. Find the best responses of each player.
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a lock-in stategy
bundling
intertemporal pricing
a teaser strategy
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Using the information from the previous question, assume that Mytown engages in free trade in
the dolls markets with Yourtown, who also faces a market with monopolistic competition.
Because of this we can expect that,
(a) The numbers of firms operating in this market will not change.
(b) At equilibrium the profit of firms will increase.
(c) The quantity of types of dolls available to consumers will increase.
(d) All the above answers are correct.
2.
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QUESTION 8
The table below shows how much the a non-Manchester United fan and a Manchester United fan would pay for an annual subscription to Manchester United TV. The marketing team at Manchester United decides to offer
two packages: a basic package that includes all games of the main, youth and women's teams (delayed by one day) and a deluxe package that includes the games (delayed by one day), recording of games from past
seasons, and exclusive player interviews.
Because there are many more non-Manchester United fans, the marketing team decides to offer the basic package for $30 to attract these fans. What is the maximum price they can charge for the deluxe package if they
want Manchester United fans to subscribe to the deluxe package rather than also subscribing to the basic package.
Manchester United TV Subscription (annual)
Value to a non-Manchester United soccer fan
Value to Manchester United fans
Basic Package
$30
$120
Deluxe Package
$40
$200
O 119.99
O 109.99
189.99
O 179 99
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a) How many players does this game have? What are the strategies of each player?
(b) What are the Nash equilibria of this game?
(c) What are the Pareto Efficient outcomes?
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4. A model of network externalities. Suppose that there are 50 potential consumers in the
market for a new technology that exhibits network effects. There is a uniform distribution
of consumers with individual valuations, v, ranging from S1, $2,.., S50. Consumer
valuation from consuming the technology is given by vN, where N is the number of
consumers adopting the technology.
Consumers with purchase the product as long as their valuation is greater or equal to the
price, so that the marginal consumer has a valuation such that p3vN. The number of
consumers adopting the technology is given by the number of people with valuation
greater than y, i.e. N = 50 - v.
%3D
a) Using the information above, derive the relationship between the price of the product and the
number of consumers adopting the product, N. Characterize this relationship – does it reflect
a typical market demand curve?
b) If the price for the product is $600, find the three equilibrium number of adopters in the
market.
c)…
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Sonic
Enter
Stay Out
Dairy Queen
(1000, 8000)
High Prices,
Low Prices
(3000, 5000)
(-1000, 4000)
Consider the entry-deterrence game shown on the game tree above. Use this information to answer the
questions #14 and #15.
14. In this situation, Dairy Queen has
an incentive to threaten high prices, which would be credible.
b. an incentive to threaten low prices, which would be credible.
an incentive to threaten high prices, which would be an empty threat.
d. an incentive to threaten low prices, which would be an empty threat.
а.
с.
е.
no incentive to make a threat.
15. Dairy Queen will receive a payoff of
in the SPE of this game.
a. $1,000
b. $3,000
c. $4,000
d. $5,000
e. $8,000
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Suppose that Bieber and Rihanna are duopolists in the music industry. In May, they agree to work together as a monopolist, charging the monopoly price for their music and producing the monopoly quantity of songs. By June, each singer is considering breaking the agreement. Assuming Bieber and Rihanna are rational, what would one expect to happen next?
Question 36 options:
a
Bieber and Rihanna will determine that it is in each singer's self interest to maintain the agreement.
b
Bieber and Rihanna will each break the agreement. Both singers' profits will decrease.
c
Bieber and Rihanna will each break the agreement. Both singers' profits will increase.
d
Bieber and Rihanna will each break the agreement. The new equilibrium quantity of songs will increase, and the new equilibrium price also will increase.
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Identify a real-world situation in which you see game theory/strategic behavior in action.
Explain the game: Who are the players ? What are the strategies they have at their disposal? How are payoffs determined? What, if any, is the Nash equilibrium?
Note, this article from Up Journey might help you come up with an example: https://upjourney.com/game-theory-examples-in-real-life
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Consider the Salop circular city model with population density S on
a circle of unit perimeter. Identical firms equidistantly locate on the
circle, each having one location, and produce a physically identical
good. Consumers are located uniformly on the circle. Each con-
sumer buys exactly one unit of the product, and always chooses the
lowest sum of transportation cost and price of the product. The
transportation cost is td where d is the distance of travel. Each
firm's costs consist of an entry cost f and a marginal cost of pro-
duction c. Consider the following two-stage game: In the first stage,
potential entrants simultaneously choose whether or not to enter.
In the second stage, then entering firms compete in prices.
(a) Determine the price level in a symmetric equilibrium of the
second-stage subgame. How does the price change with n?
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Use the following information to answer questions 1 to 5.
A firm is deciding whether or not to enter a new market. The decision tree for the firm is provided below.
The prompt below the decision tree explains how the decision tree was created.
Enter
Do Not Enter
Allowed
0.9
Denied
0.1
3
Research
No Research
Good
0.7
Bad
0.3
5
6
Produce
Sell
Produce
Sell
Produce
Sell
8
9
10
High
0.75
Low
0.25
High
0.25
Low
0.75
High
0.6
Low
0.4
Profit (5000s)
1200
-800
-200
1200
-800
-200
1400
-600
0
-100
0
At node 1, the firm must decide whether to enter the new market or not. The cost of attempting to enter
is $100,000. The upper branch from node 2 shows that the firm has a 0.9 probability of being allowed to
enter the market. If the firm is allowed to enter, it will have to pay $1,500,000 to buy the facilities required
to become a part of the market. Node 3 shows that the firm will then consider doing a research study to
forecast demand for their new product prior to beginning production. The cost of…
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A ________ occurs if all players in a game play their best strategies given what their competitors do.
a )
Nash equilibrium
b )
prisonerʹs dilemma
c )
dominant strategy
d )
tit‐for‐tat strategy
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The global pandemic 2020 has promoted a race to capture the market for introducing effective vaccine and treatments.
a. If PFIZER is the sole vaccine provider given the following information, answer the questions below:
Output
Price/Unit
Total Cost
1
5500
1000
2
5000
1200
3
4500
1500
4
4000
2500
5
3500
4000
6
3000
5700
7
2500
7500
8
2000
9400
9
1500
11400
10
1000
13500
Given the tabular information above find the profit-maximizing output and price also illustrate the same using the two-dimensional labeled diagram. Show the calculation as well.
b. Assume if many firms enter into the business of providing vaccine determine:
How the demand curve of PFIZER would change and how it would now maximize its profit? The kind of market structure now PFIZER…
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Game theory terminology
Select the term that best describes each definition listed in the following table.
Definition
Nash Equilibrium
Dominant Strategy
Collusion
Tit-for-tat Strategy
Payoff Matrix
Prisoners' Dilemma Game
A strategy in which a player cooperates until the other player defects and then defects until the other player cooperates again
The event that occurs when agents in a game form an agreement about which strategies to implement
A player's best choice, if it exists, regardless of his or her opponent's strategy
A case in which individually rational behavior leads to a jointly inefficient outcome
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Discuss main motivations to use the Nash Equilibrium as a solution concept.
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6) The following is a static game
D
2,2
0,3
D
3,0
1,1
a) Convert this game into dynamic form game
b) Find the Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.
c) If you consider this game as dynamic then what kind of dynamic game is this.
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Figure: Insulin Prices
Suppose a major insulin manufacturer sells in two markets, the U.S.A. and Mexico. If the marginal cost is the same in both markets, to maximize profits, it would charge _______ in the U.S.A. and _________ in Mexico.
Group of answer choices
$3700, $600
$50, $50
$3650, $550
$600, 3700
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24. Two individuals play the following infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game:
Player A
Cooperate
Defect
Player B
Cooperate
3,5
7,0
Defect
0,6
1, 1
Assume that both players discount future payoffs at rate 8<1.
(a) If both players play 'cooperate' every period, then what are their total payoffs?
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A trader wants to open a diamond shop in the Singapore area with a choice of
the Kembangan, Orchard or Sembawang area. Each'of these area options has a
local supplier providing a price quote for the diamond as detailed in the table
below.
Area
Kembangan
Orchard
Sembawang
Questions:
a. What is the volume that must be met to get the economic value per area?
Determine the volume range for each area.
b. Make a crossover chart sketch that describes these conditions
c. If in the end the merchant wants to sell as many as 600 cans at a selling price of
Rp. 60,000 per can, calculate the profit from each area. Where did the merchant
finally determine his location?
Fixed cost
5,500,000.00
11,500,000.00
21,500,000.00
Variable cost
55,000.00
35,500.00
15,500.00
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Profits for two competing firms depend on the decisions to advertise or not to advertise as follows: If neither firm advertises, each makes a weekly profit of $100. If one firm advertises while the other does not, the firm that advertises makes $120 while the firm that doesn’t advertise makes $60. If both firms advertise, each firm makes $80.
(a) What is the Nash equilibrium? Is this outcome efficient, from the perspective of the two firms?
(b) How does the outcome of the game change if the parties can make a binding agreement in advance about advertising practices?
(c) How does the game change if it is repeated over the course of many weeks (but the firms cannot make a binding agreement about how much advertising they will do)?
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Related Questions
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- The definition of Game Theory is: Game Theory is a field of mathematics that analyzes strategic-interaction between rational, self-interested players. Give an example of a situation that can be considered a game from the perspective of game theory. You can choose this example from your experience or you can consider a hypothetical scenario. Use your own imagination and make sure this is not any famous or known example used in game theory. 1. What is happening in this game? 2. Who are the players in this game? 3. What are the possible actions for each player? 4. Represent the game in normal form with the utilities you have mentioned in the description of the game. 5. Justify the utilities you have assigned. 6. Find the best responses of each player.arrow_forwarda lock-in stategy bundling intertemporal pricing a teaser strategyarrow_forwardUsing the information from the previous question, assume that Mytown engages in free trade in the dolls markets with Yourtown, who also faces a market with monopolistic competition. Because of this we can expect that, (a) The numbers of firms operating in this market will not change. (b) At equilibrium the profit of firms will increase. (c) The quantity of types of dolls available to consumers will increase. (d) All the above answers are correct. 2.arrow_forward
- QUESTION 8 The table below shows how much the a non-Manchester United fan and a Manchester United fan would pay for an annual subscription to Manchester United TV. The marketing team at Manchester United decides to offer two packages: a basic package that includes all games of the main, youth and women's teams (delayed by one day) and a deluxe package that includes the games (delayed by one day), recording of games from past seasons, and exclusive player interviews. Because there are many more non-Manchester United fans, the marketing team decides to offer the basic package for $30 to attract these fans. What is the maximum price they can charge for the deluxe package if they want Manchester United fans to subscribe to the deluxe package rather than also subscribing to the basic package. Manchester United TV Subscription (annual) Value to a non-Manchester United soccer fan Value to Manchester United fans Basic Package $30 $120 Deluxe Package $40 $200 O 119.99 O 109.99 189.99 O 179 99arrow_forwarda) How many players does this game have? What are the strategies of each player? (b) What are the Nash equilibria of this game? (c) What are the Pareto Efficient outcomes?arrow_forward4. A model of network externalities. Suppose that there are 50 potential consumers in the market for a new technology that exhibits network effects. There is a uniform distribution of consumers with individual valuations, v, ranging from S1, $2,.., S50. Consumer valuation from consuming the technology is given by vN, where N is the number of consumers adopting the technology. Consumers with purchase the product as long as their valuation is greater or equal to the price, so that the marginal consumer has a valuation such that p3vN. The number of consumers adopting the technology is given by the number of people with valuation greater than y, i.e. N = 50 - v. %3D a) Using the information above, derive the relationship between the price of the product and the number of consumers adopting the product, N. Characterize this relationship – does it reflect a typical market demand curve? b) If the price for the product is $600, find the three equilibrium number of adopters in the market. c)…arrow_forward
- What pricing strategy is best for manufacturing smartphones? For instance, skimming pricing strategy or penetration strategy or value based pricing strategy. What is the most appropriate or what is the best to use in manufacturing smart phones.arrow_forward(a) Compute the Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies of the game above. (b) Compute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.(c) Compute the perfect Bayesian euilibrium. (I need help with how to solve these questions in detail)arrow_forwardWhat are the typical orientation of the markets and audiences for new online media producers?arrow_forward
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Recommended textbooks for you
- Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Cengage Learning