Example Game Theory Questions -- solutions guide-1

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Apr 25, 2024

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` ERIC BUDISH COMPETITIVE STRATEGY eric.budish@ChicagoBooth.edu Winter 2024 Suggested Answers for Example Game Theory Modeling Questions Q1 Suggested Solution 1. What are the audiophiles’ valuations for the high and the low quality speakers? Would they be willing to buy high quality speakers? Would they be willing to buy low quality speakers? Which, if any, type of speakers would they buy if both types are available? Answer the same questions for philistines as well. Audiophiles valuations: For high quality speakers: 950-4000*0.1-300=250 For low quality speakers: 950-4000*0.2-100=50 They would be willing to buy high quality; They would be willing to buy low quality; They would buy high quality if both were available. Philistines’ valuations: For high quality speakers: 350-1000*0.1-300=-50 For low quality speakers: 350-1000*0.2-100=50 They would not want to buy high quality speakers. They would be willing to buy low quality speakers. They would buy low quality if both were available. 2. Draw the payoff matrix for this game between A and B. Identify all dominant strategies and Nash equilibria (if any). Describe in words what you would expect the outcome to be and why. If both firms produce high quality speakers, they split the audiophile market. They each will have volume of 50 and variable profits of $100 per unit, for total profit of $5k. Philistines do not buy. If one firm produces high quality speakers and the other produces low quality speakers, then the high quality firm will sell to all 100 audiophiles, for profits of 100*$100 = $10k, while the low quality firm will sell to all 100 Philistines, for profits of 100*$40 = $4k. Last, if both firms produce low quality speakers, then ALL customers will buy low quality speakers, so they each have quantity of 100 and profits of 100*$40 = $4k. The resulting payoff matrix is:
2 B High Low High 5 4 5 10 A Low 10 4 4 4 High is the dominant strategy for both A and B. The unique Nash equilibrium is (High, High) Both companies will produce high quality speakers because the margin on those speakers is more than twice as large as the margin on low quality. Hence, producing high quality speakers is a more profitable option regardless of what the other company does. In other words, High is a dominant strategy. The (High, High) outcome does not maximize their joint profits. They would make more money if one made high and the other low, but neither company internalizes the impact of their choice on the other company’s profits. 3. What do you expect would happen if A and B merge? Would they be able to create or capture more value? The merged company would produce both High and Low speakers since that would generate profits of $14,000, which is more than the $10,000 they would get from producing only High. This provision of a new good would create value. The merger would also capture value if the combined firms could raise prices, but the model presumes that the price of each good is the same whether there are one or two firms producing it. Q2 Suggested Solution (i) OpenTable should set the price to $25 per night to maximize revenue. This way it sells to all the H restaurants (50% of the market) and to none of the L restaurants. A price of $1 gets more sales – now L’s buy too – but less total revenue. (ii) Yes, an H-type should be willing to be listed. The first H-type to list would go from having 50 customers (all Phonies) to having a full restaurant with 100 customers. The increase in variable profits more than compensates for the cost of paying OpenTable for web traffic. (iii) Yes, if there are 49 H-types on opentable.com, the 50 th should join too. With 50 restaurants on opentable.com, each will get 2 “Webbies”. This traffic costs $2 in OpenTable fees, but generates $20 in incremental variable profits, so it is profitable to join. (iv) No, an L-type restaurant should not join. This is a bit subtle. The difference versus an H- type is that the L-types don’t really want the hardware system. They would have to pay $25 per night for a system that gives them only $1 per night of incremental benefit. This
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